In a recent paper (Int. J. Quantum Inf. 17 (2019) 1950026), the authors discussed the shortcomings in the security of a quantum private comparison protocol that we previously proposed. They also proposed a new protocol aimed to avoid these problems. Here we analysis the information leaked in their protocol, and find that it is even less secure than our protocol in certain cases. We further propose an improved version which has the following advantages: (1) no entanglement needed, (2) quantum memory is no longer required, and (3) less information leaked. Therefore, better security and great feasibility are both achieved.
I. INTRODUCTION
Private comparison [1] is a two-party cryptographic problem where Alice has a private data a and Bob has a private data b. They want to determine whether a and b are equal, without revealing any extra information on their values other than what can be inferred from the comparison result.
It is well-known that unconditionally secure quantum two-party secure computations are impossible [2, 3] . Therefore, most existing quantum private comparison (QPC) protocols added a third party to accomplish the task (see [4] and the references therein). In 2016, we proposed a QPC protocol [5] which involves two parties only. Although it is not unconditionally secure, the loose upper bound of the average amount of information leaked is 14 bits only. It is also very feasible because quantum memory and entanglement are not required. Later, we further proposed the device-independent version of the protocol [6] .
As Kilian pointed out [7] , "the reason two-party protocol problems are so difficult is due to a simple symmetry condition on what players know about each others data". Therefore, most previous studies on two-party cryptography merely interested in the security against internal cheating from legitimate participants (i.e., Alice and Bob). The security against the attack from external eavesdroppers is not considered as an obligated task of two-party secure computation protocols, as can be seen from the insecurity proofs [2, 3] , the proposals on relativistic bit commitment that are considered unconditionally secure [8] [9] [10] , and discussions on oblivious transfer [11] . That is, in literature two-party secure computation protocols were regarded as secure as long as it can defeat internal attacks. It is not considered as a "loophole" even if the external party Eve can cheat in these protocols. This is also the case of our previous QPC protocol in [5] . Nevertheless, it is surely an appealing improvement * Electronic address: hegp@mail.sysu.edu.cn if external eavesdropping can be defeated too.
Recently, Wu, Cai, Wu and Zhang [12] reported the above problem of the protocol in [5] , and they also proposed a new one (called as WCWZ protocol thereafter) aiming to achieve security against external eavesdropping. They also stated that the protocol in [5] has a second problem that "the result of comparison can be manipulated partially by either party", and "He's original protocol is not suitable for a smaller bit-length comparison protocol". We would like to note that in [5] , it was already elaborated that 14 bits is merely the loose upper bound of the average amount of information leaked, and no cheating strategy has been found that can saturate this bound. Also, when comparing short strings, Fig. 1 of [5] shows that this loose upper bound will be much less than 14 bits (more rigorous calculation and comparison with the WCWZ protocol will be provided at the end of section III.C and in section VI.A). On the other hand, however, we are glad to see that these bounds could be made even lower. Unfortunately, Ref. [12] has not provided a rigorous calculation on the amount of information leaked in their own protocol.
In the current paper, we will study the amount of information leaked in the WCWZ protocol, so that the performance of the protocols can be compared clearly. Moreover, we will propose an improved protocol, which not only has all the advantages of the WCWZ protocol (e.g., secure against external eavesdropping, and low amount of information leaked without the need of a third party), but also requires much less quantum resources (e.g., quantum memory and entanglement) so that it becomes much more feasible.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the WCWZ protocol will be reviewed, and we will analyze its amount of information leaked and related problems in section III. In section IV, we will propose our improved protocol. Then we will prove its security in section V and compare it with the protocols in [12] and [5] in section VI.
II. THE WCWZ PROTOCOL
In section 3.3 of [12] , Wu, Cai, Wu and Zhang proposed the following protocol.
The WCWZ Protocol:
Step 1. Using a 1-to-1 classical hash function H : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , Alice computes the n-bit string H(a) = h Step 2. Alice divides the value H(a) into ⌈n/m⌉ (m ≥ 2) groups, which are
Bob does the same operation as Alice and obtains [12] as is.)
Step 3. Alice (Bob) prepares m Bell states as initial states, every Bell state is randomly chosen from |Φ + = (|00 + |11 )/ √ 2, |Ψ + = (|01 + |10 )/ √ 2. Alice (Bob) records these initial states as S A (S B ). The first particles of all Bell states S A (S B ) form the sequence S A1 (S B1 ), and the rest form the sequence S A2 (S B2 ).
Step 4. Alice (Bob) prepares decoy states
), then sends it to Bob (Alice).
Step 5. After confirming that Bob (Alice) has received the quantum sequence S ), and gets the sequences S A1 (S B1 ). Therefore, Alice and Bob can check the existence of an Eve by a predetermined threshold of error rate. If the error rate is limited to the predetermined threshold, there is no Eve and the protocol continues. Otherwise, Alice and Bob abort the protocol and restart from step 1.
Step 6. Bob (Alice), respectively, performs X = |1 0| + |0 1| or I = |0 0| + |1 1| operation on the ith particle of sequence S A1 (S B1 ) when h Step 8. Bob (Alice) performs X = |1 0| + |0 1| or I = |0 0| + |1 1| operation on the ith particle of sequence S 
III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE WCWZ PROTOCOL A. A trivial problem
This protocol contains an obvious problem, probably came from typos. That is, the secret information a and b that Alice and Bob want to compare are n-bit strings, but in step 3 they exchange m Bell states only (where m < n, as can be seen from step 2), i.e., only the first m bits of the hash values H(a) and H(b) are compared. Consequently, there will be the problem that if H(a) = H(b) while the first m bits of H(a) and H(b) happen to be identical, their protocol will mistakenly output H(a) = H(b) in step 8 as the final result.
There is a trivial fix to this problem. In step 8 when Alice and Bob found the m bits being compared are identical, they should repeat steps 3-8 again, exchanging another set of m Bell states to compare the next m bits of H(a) and H(b). They repeat this procedure over and over until there is a run in which step 8 shows that some bits of H(a) and H(b) are different, or until all bits are compared and shown to be identical. With this modification, the protocol will always output the correct result. Actually we believe that this is exactly what the authors had in mind. But without this modification explicitly written, the original protocol in [12] cannot be regarded as correct.
B. Simultaneity problem
In step 7 of the WCWZ protocol, Alice and Bob are required to "publish the positions and the measurement bases of D ′ A and D ′ B simultaneously". But in literature, cryptographic protocols should generally be presented in a sequential way, that each party takes operations in turn, without requiring two or more parties to perform operations simultaneously. This is because, on one hand, according to special relativity, distant simultaneity -whether two spatially separated events occur at the same time -is not absolute, but depends on the observer's reference frame. On the other hand, if the security of a protocol relies on simultaneity, then it leaves room for potential cheats. For example, consider that the distance between Alice's and Bob's sites is L, and they are supposed to receive messages from each other at time t 1 which is measured in the same reference frame stationary to both of them. If they communicate with methods in which the message carrier travels with the light speed c, then each of them should start sending her/his message at time t 0 ≡ t 1 − L/c. But dishonest Bob may set up an "agent" site secretly, which is L/3 away from Alice. Then if honest Alice sends her message at time t 0 , Bob's agent site will receive it at time t
In this case, Bob has a time interval with the length (1/3)L/c to analysis the message received from Alice, and decide the content of the message to be sent which could benefit his cheating, and send it at time t ′′ 1 ≡ t 0 +(2/3)L/c. His message will still reach Alice at time t 1 so that this cheating cannot be detected. But he manages to delay the sending of his message until he receives Alice's message so that the simultaneity is broken.
In fact, if there is an approach to force both Alice and Bob to send messages simultaneously, then coin flipping (CF) can be easily realized even without quantum methods, as shown in the appendix. But it is a widelyaccepted result that unconditionally secure quantum CF with an arbitrarily small bias is impossible [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] . This is another evidence showing that in literature, simultaneity is not accepted in cryptography.
Nevertheless, in practice the cheating making use of relativity of simultaneity not only needs extremely fast quantum operations, but also involved very complicated coherent attacks (e.g., those described in [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] ). For this reason, the requirement of simultaneity in the WCWZ protocol still looks acceptable, and we assume that it can be realized in the rest of this paper.
C. Information leaked
In [12] the authors did not give a rigorous evaluation on the amount of information leaked in their protocol.
Here we provide such an evaluation.
Since Alice and Bob compare m bits of H(a) and H(b) all at the same time, they will always know m bits of the other's data no matter the comparison result is identical or not. Therefore, even when nobody cheats, the protocol leaks at least m bits of information to the other party, with or without including the modification in section III.A. Now consider the case where the above modification is included, i.e., if the first m bits of H(a) and H(b) are found to be identical, Alice and Bob continue to compare the rest bits. Given that the hash function H(x) (x ∈ {a, b}) is a random mapping between x and y = H(x), each pair of the hash bits h A i and h B i stands probability 1/2 to be identical. Consequently, when Alice and Bob compare the first m bits of H(a) and H(b) using the WCWZ protocol, the probability for finding all these m bits to be identical in step 8 (so that the protocol continues) is
and the probability for finding at least one of these m bits to be different in step 8 (so that the protocol aborts) is then
If the protocol indeed aborts, then both Alice and Bob know these m bits of mutual information on the other's private data. That is, there is probability p a that the amount of information leaked is m bits.
Else if these m bits are identical (which occurs with probability p m ) and Alice and Bob continue to compare the next m bits by repeating steps 3-8 for the 2nd round, then again there will be probability p a that the next m bits are different so that the protocol aborts after the 2nd round. In this case both parties know the first 2m bits. That is, with probability p m p a the protocol will abort at the 2nd round, and the amount of information leaked is 2m bits.
Continue with this analysis, we can see that the probability for the protocol to abort at the i-th round is
and the amount of information leaked is im bits. For simplicity, suppose that n/m is an integer. Then summing over all possible i values, we finally yield the average amount of mutual information leaked
Note that this value does not included the amount of information leaked when the protocol never aborts in the middle, but continues until all bits are compared and found to be identical instead. This is correct, because when a and b are identical, both Alice and Bob surely know all the n bits, and this is allowed since by definition a QPC protocol is secure as long as it does not reveal any extra information on the compared values "other than what can be inferred from the comparison result". strings a and b is fixed as n = 360360. From the figure we can find the following results:
(1) The value of I grows as m increases. It indicates that introducing m in the WCWZ protocol is completely unnecessary, and taking m ≥ 2 in step 2 is not a wise choice. The less m value is, the less amount of information will be leaked to Alice and Bob. Thus the optimal choice is m = 1. That is, Alice and Bob should not divide H(a) and H(b) into ⌈n/m⌉ groups in step 2. Instead, they should better compare them bit-by-bit, like we did in our protocol in [5] .
(2) If Alice and Bob choose m ≥ 14, then there is I ≥ 14 bits. In this case the WCWZ protocol is always less secure than ours in [5] for any length of the strings being compared.
(3) When comparing very short strings, the WCWZ protocol is also less secure than ours in [5] even for m < 14. For example, when n = 6, Eq. (6) gives that I ≃ 2.53 bits when m = 2, and I ≃ 1.88 bits when m = 1. On the contrary, when using our protocol in [5] , Eqs. (7) and (8) of [5] show that the average amount of information leaked for n = 6 is merely I ≃ 1.43 bits for dishonest Alice and I ≃ 1.05 bits for dishonest Bob, both of them are smaller than that of the WCWZ protocol.
D. Feasibility problems
The WCWZ protocol is also very costly in terms of quantum resource.
First, it takes a great amount of quantum memory. As can be seen from steps 5 and 7, whenever Alice and Bob receive the sequences S 
To this day, the technology for handling entangled states is still far from perfect. Long-term storage for quantum states is even more challenging. Thus, the above requirements make the WCWZ protocol very infeasible.
IV. OUR IMPROVED PROTOCOL
From the above analysis, we can see that the WCWZ protocol can be improved in many ways. Here we propose the following one.
Our Improved Protocol:
Step i. Using a 1-to-1 classical hash function H : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , Alice computes the n-bit hash value H(a) = h Step ii. Bob encodes h B i as follows:
Step ii-1. Alice sends Bob the sequence S ′ A which contains k+1 qubits. The state of each qubit is randomly prepared as |0 , |1 ,
Step ii-2. Bob randomly picks k qubits from sequence S ′ A and measures them immediately. The measurement basis for each qubit is randomly chosen as either {|0 , |1 } or {|+ , |− }. These k qubits serve as the decoy state sequence D A . The only qubit that left unmeasured serves as the code qubit (denoted as S A ). Bob does not need to store the code qubit either. He applies the unitary transformation X = |1 0| + |0 1| or I = |0 0| + |1 1| on it when h Step ii-3. Alice measures all the qubits in S ′′′ A using the same basis β A , which is randomly chosen as either {|0 , |1 } or {|+ , |− }.
Step ii-4. Bob announces which qubits of the sequence S ′ A was picked as the decoy states D A , and Alice announces their original states. Bob checks whether his measurement result in step ii-2 conflicts with Alice's announcement. Note that they should better reveal and check these decoy states one-by-one, instead of revealing the information of all the qubits in D A at one time. Once they find a single conflicting result (in the ideal scenario) or the error rate exceeds the predetermined threshold (in the fault-tolerant scenario), they should conclude that there is eavesdropping and abort the protocol immediately. Else if no eavesdropping was detected then they continue. After all qubits in sequence D A were checked, Alice naturally knows which qubit was picked as Bob's code qubit S A .
Step ii-5. Alice checks whether she had prepared S A in the basis β A . If not, she tells Bob to discard all the data for S ′ A and S ′′′ A , and restart from step ii-1 over again. Or if the answer is yes, then it implies that she has measured S A in step ii-3 using the same basis in which S A was prepared, which is also the eigenbasis for S ′′ A after Bob applied his unitary transformation X or I in step ii-2. In this case, Alice tells Bob to keep the data of the sequence S ′′′ A , and they continue with the next step. Note that at this stage, Alice still does not know which qubit in S ′′′ A is the resultant code qubit S ′′ A . This information will be revealed later in step v.
Step iii. Alice encodes h A i using much the same way as step ii, except in the reverse direction. That is:
Step iii-1. Bob sends Alice the sequence S ′ B which contains k+1 qubits. The state of each qubit is randomly prepared as |0 , |1 ,
Step iii-2. Alice randomly picks k qubits from sequence S Step iii-3. Bob measures all the qubits in S ′′′ B using the same basis β B , which is randomly chosen as either {|0 , |1 } or {|+ , |− }.
Step iii-4. Alice announces which qubits of the sequence S ′ B was picked as the decoy states D B , and Bob announces their original states. Alice checks whether her measurement result in step iii-2 conflicts with Bob's announcement. Like step ii-4, these decoy states should be checked one-by-one. If all qubits in sequence D B were checked and no eavesdropping was detected, Bob naturally knows which qubit was picked as Alice's code qubit S B .
Step iii-5. Bob checks whether he had prepared S B in the basis β B . If not, he tells Alice to discard all the data for S ′ B and S ′′′ B , and restart from step iii-1 over again. Or if the answer is yes, Bob tells Alice to keep the data of the sequence S ′′′ B , and they continue with the next step.
Step vi. Alice (Bob) announces the states of a random portion (e.g., 50%) of the decoy state sequence D ′′ B (D ′′ A ), and Bob (Alice) checks whether it conflicts with his (her) measurement result in step iii-3 (step ii-3).
Step v. Alice and Bob announce simultaneously which qubit in the sequence S Step vii. Now both Alice and Bob know h . If all pairs were compared and found to be identical, they end the protocol with the conclusion that a = b.
Note that in step v we assume that Alice and Bob can announce information simultaneously, just like they did in step 7 of the WCWZ protocol. In case this simultaneity is not available, the protocol needs a minor modification. That is, similar to our protocol in [5] , when i is odd (even), let Alice announce the information after (before) Bob does. With this modification, the amount of information leaked will become a little higher, because in the odd (even) rounds, dishonest Alice (Bob) may alter her (his) announcement basing on what the other party already announced, thus slightly increase the probability for finding h A i = h B i in this round, like it was elaborated in section 4 of [5] .
As the WCWZ protocol made use of the existence of simultaneity, for a fair comparison, in the following security analysis we also take simultaneity as available, i.e., we only study our protocol with the original form of its step v without including the above modification.
V. SECURITY OF OUR IMPROVED PROTOCOL A. External eavesdropping
The key reason that Eve cannot cheat, is because the code qubits are protected by the decoy states. Especially, in step ii-1 (step iii-1) when Alice (Bob) sends sequence S ′ A (S ′ B ) to Bob (Alice), none of them has specified which qubit will become the code qubit S A (S B ) so that Eve cannot know it either. The rest k qubits in sequence S 
2 that such a resent qubit will be found as conflicting result in Bob's (Alice's) measurement. For example, Alice prepared the state as |0 , but Eve has probability 1/2 to pick the wrong basis {|+ , |− } to measure and resend it, and Bob has probability 1/2 to pick the right basis {|0 , |1 } to measure and also has probability 1/2 to find the result as |1 . Thus the total probability for Eve to escape the detection for all the αk qubits will be
which drops exponentially to zero as k increases. At the end of step ii-2 (step iii-2) when sequence
is sending back to Alice (Bob), at first glance it seems less secure because in step ii-3 (step iii-3) all the qubits in this sequence will be measured in the same basis β A (β B ). That is, Eve has probability 1/2 to pick the right basis for measuring and resending all these qubits so that she will not be detected. But in this case, she still does not know h ). But as shown in the previous paragraph, the probability for Eve to learn the states of S A and S B while escaping the detection is trivial. Thus, it is clear that our protocol is secure against external eavesdropping.
Also, Eve cannot spoil the protocol (i.e., mislead Alice and Bob to a wrong comparison result) even if she made the right guess on the measurement basis β A (β B ). This is because if she resends all qubits as-is after she measured them in this basis, then the protocol works as usual since the values of h could be flipped) is merely 1/(k + 1), which is trivial as k increases. Or if Eve applies the transformation X on more than one qubit, then there is at least one qubit will lead to conflicting result when Alice and Bob checks the decoy states. Consequently, when h
Eve cannot lead Alice and Bob to the opposite result without being detected.
B. Internal attack
Obviously, when the protocol aborts at the i-th round, both Alice and Bob surely know that the first i − 1 bits of h There is no secret in these bits. Therefore, the goal of a dishonest party is to try to make the protocol abort as late as possible, so that he can learn more bits of data of the other party. Now we show that this is impossible.
When both parties are honest and the hash function H(x) is a random mapping between x and y = H(x), the average probability for h A i = h B i (so that the protocol does not abort) is 1/2. To show that a dishonest party cannot cheat, we need to show that this probability cannot be increased.
As the protocol is symmetrical, without loss of generality, let us assume that Alice is dishonest. Before step v of the protocol, Bob has not announced which qubit in the sequence S As we mentioned in the previous section, when simultaneity is not available, the protocol needs modification. Then the amount of information leaked will become higher because dishonest party may increase the probability for finding h A i = h B i in half of the rounds. But since step 7 of the WCWZ protocol also makes use of the existence of simultaneity, for a fair comparison between the protocols, here we assume that simultaneity is available for our improved protocol too, without taking the above mentioned modification into account.
VI. ADVANTAGES OF OUR IMPROVED PROTOCOL
A. Security of the average amount of mutual information leaked to Alice (Bob) in our previous protocol in [5] , which is calculated from Eq. (7) (Eq. (8)) of [5] . From the comparison we find the following results.
(I) Since the WCWZ protocol suggested to take m ≥ 2 in its step 2, it is always less secure (i.e., the amount of information leaked is higher) than our improved protocol for any value of the length n of the strings being compared.
(II) Comparing with our previous protocol in [5] , as we mentioned in section III.C, when taking m ≥ 14, the WCWZ protocol is always less secure than ours in [5] for any length of the strings being compared. Thus the WCWZ protocol may be valuable only when 2 ≤ m ≤ 13, which is covered by the area between the black solid line and the black dashed line in Fig. 2 . Even in this range, when m = 2 (m = 13), we can see that the amount of information leaked in the WCWZ protocol is still higher than that in our previous one in [5] for n ≤ 10 (n ≤ 60). In fact, even our improved protocol in the current paper (where m = 1) cannot be less secure than our previous one when n ≤ 8. Furthermore, as mentioned before, I A and I B in Fig. 2 are merely the loose bounds of the protocol in [5] . Thus the claim in [12] that "He's original protocol is not suitable for a smaller bit-length comparison protocol" is obviously wrong. Instead, the WCWZ protocol is even worst for comparing short strings.
(III) The simultaneity problem. Both step 7 of the WCWZ protocol and step v of our improved protocol require the existence of simultaneity. Thus our previous protocol in [5] wins again as it does not have this requirement. In case simultaneously publishing informations is impossible, both the WCWZ protocol and our improved one need modification. Then the amount of information leaked in these two protocols could be even higher than what is shown in Fig. 2 .
B. Feasibility
This is where our protocols really shine. As we stated in section III.D, the WCWZ protocol not only requires the quantum memory for storing 2(k + 2m) qubits, but also 2n pairs of Bell states for comparing two n-bit strings a and b. On the contrary, in both of our improved protocol and the previous one in [5] , Alice and Bob merely need to send qubits prepared in the pure states |0 , |1 , |+ and |− non-entangled with other systems. Also, once they receive the qubits, they can measure them immediately without the need to wait for the other party to announce further information, thus no quantum memory is required. Therefore, our two protocols are both much more feasible than the WCWZ protocol, and can be implemented with currently available technology.
VII. SUMMARY
We analyzed the amount of information leaked in the WCWZ protocol, and found that it is less secure than our previous protocol in [5] against internal attacks when m ≥ 14. For comparing short bit-strings with the length n ≤ 10, the WCWZ protocol is always less secure than ours no matter which m value it chooses, in contrast to the claim in [12] .
We also proposed an improved protocol, which is more secure than the WCWZ protocol for any length of the strings being compared. Moreover, the WCWZ protocol has to rely on the use of quantum memory and entanglement, while these resources are not needed in both of our improved protocol and the previous one.
